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This note discusses a c tanalytic method applicable to some public-key cryptosystems based 
on the theory of forma uages. Essentially, the method uses the fact that the ima 
regular language under an inverse finite substitution is aceepttd by a finite automaton of the same 
size as the automaton accepting the original regular language. In particular, systems based on 
iterated morphicms and repeated finite substitutions, f2,3j, wif1 be discussed. 
1. Introduction 
In this note we introduce a new cryptanalytic method, based on the fact that the 
image of a regular language in an inverse substitution is easy to compute. ft gives 
an 0(n3) algorithm for finding the plaintext from a cryptotext of length n. The 
method needs no preprocessing. 
We first briefly describe the cryptosystem discussed, for instance, in [2]. It is bas- 
ed on the theory of L systems= The reader catl find more information about E 
systems in [I]. This note is largely self-contained. 
Let C be an alphabet, ho and h, two morphisms from C* to Z* and w a nonemp- 
ty word over Cs. For a sequence i, & . . . in, where eacn tj is 0 or 1) we denote 
(w)iliz...in = hi,(.mm hi2(hi,(W))...). (1) 
Let 4 be another aiphabet and g : A * --* C* be a morphism mapping every Petter of 
A to a letter of C or to the empty word A. In practice A should be of a much greater 
cardinahty than C, perhaps ome 200 letters in A. For each Q E C* letters in g- ‘(a) 
are called descendants of a and letters in g-‘(A) are dummy symbcls. Each letter of 
C Gould have at least one descendant, 
We also choose two substitutions a0 and q on d such that for each de 8, 
itz {Q 1) and XE q(d) we have g(x) = hi@(d)). Finally, let u be a word in g-‘(w). 
The quadruple H= (A, oo, al, u) constitutes the public encryption key. A piiain- 
text i&..&, where each 4 is 0 or 1, is encrypted by choosing an arbitrary word 
from 
!2? 
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The quadruple G =(Z, h&r, w) and the morphism g are kept secret. From the 
definitions it follows immediately, for any cryptotext 6: in the set (2), that 
g(c) = (w)i,iz...i,. (3) 
%n the terminology of L systems, C is called a DTOL systen? and H is a TOE 
system. The decryption of the cryptotext c is carried out by finding the sequence 
ir i2. . . in satisfying (3). This plaintext should of course be unique. Therefore the 
DT@L system G is required to be backward eterministic, that is, the condition 
always implies 
. . il12...Jn = jlj2...jm. (3 
But this is not enough. We want the decryption to be easy as well. For this pur- 
pose we require that G is strongly backward eterministic. This means that if 
c = (w)i&...i, (6) 
and c= I@) for some word x in %?c and k E (0, 1), then 
k = in (7) 
and 
x = (w)ili2...in__r. (8) 
Thus, every word generated by a strongly backwa ii-d deterministic DTOL system has 
a unique predecessor. 
2. Cryptanalysis 
The following simple observation makes the cryptanalysis possible: 
Theorem. Let A be an alphabet, o a finite substitution on A* and A a nondeter- 
ministicfinite automaton (NFA) accepting a language L(A) over A. Then there ex- 
ists Q NFA B such that L(B) = ct - ‘(L(A)) and the set of states in B equals the set Q 
of states in A. This B can be constructed in time D(kB ‘:. where n is the cardinality 
of Q and k denotes the size of the substitution c (more precisely k equals 
Proof. The state sets as well as the initial and the final states of A and B are iden- 
tical. For each state q, letter a and word x in o(a) we compute the set of staics that 
can be reached in automaton A from the state q with the input word X. Into exactly 
these states we set a transition in B from q with the letter a. This can be done in 
O(I_y( l n + n) steps. 
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Obviously the automaton B constructed in this way, accepts the language 
a-‘@+(A)). The whole procedure can be carried out in time 0(kn2). 0 
We now describe how this theorem offers us a method for cryptanz!ysls, provided 
the underlying DTOL system is strongly backward deterministic. Suppose we are 
given a public TOL system H= (d, 00, cl, U) and a cryptotext c= clc2.. c,, . We first 
construct an NFA A accepting only the word c: 
-o”o”o- . ..-a() 
The following steps (i), (ii) and (iii) are repeated until u is in L(A): 
(i) For i= 0, 1, construct an NFA Bi that accepts the language $‘@(A)). Ac- 
cording to our theorem this can be done quickly. 
(ii) Suppose L(Bk) is nonempty, with k either 0 or 1. Set k as the last bit in the 
unknown prefix of the plaintext. 
(iii) Choose Bk as A. 
Suppose the correct plaintext is ili2 . . . im and at the beginning of some iteration 
loop of steps (i) to (iii) we find 
g(L(A)) = (w)ili2 . . . 4. (9) 
Then after step (i) we have 
hi(g(L(Bi))) = (w)il . . . 4 for i = 0,l. (10) 
It follows from (7) aad (10) that exactly one of the languages L(Bo) and L(B, ) is 
nonempty, namely L(&.). So the selection of R: in step (ii) is unique and k = 4. The 
conditions (8) and (10) imply that 
g(C(A)) ‘I jw)i*i2 . . . ij_ 1 (11) 
holds true at the beginning of the next iteration loop. 
After these observations we conclude that after m 1c;oys of(i), (ii) and (iii) we have 
found the plaintext. All *.uords x such that 
CE (T,(... cQ(q[..Y)) . ..). (12) 
including a, are in L(A). Thus we know when to finish the itelmation. 
The worst-case time complexity of this procedure is apparently 0(kmn2), where 
n and na are the lengths of t:rpe cryptotext and the plaintext, respectively, and k 
denotes the total size of the two substitutions o. and ol. 
3. Conchlsio~ 
We have presented a polynomial time method for the cryptanalysis of the system 
based on iterated morphisms, [2]. The essential property of the underlying secret 
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DTOL system we needed was strong backward eterminism. Without this property 
our algorithm does not work. Unfortunately this property is also essential for the 
legal recipient of messages, because it makes the fast parsing of the DTOL system 
possible. It is likely that other methods to guarantee easy parsing can be found. But 
it seems also possible that each such method gives rise to a similar easy parsing 
method of the corresponding public TOL system. 
We want to point out that a similar approach can as well be used to break another 
cryptosystem, based on repeated substitutions, [3]. In this system a sequence of 
morphisms from P to P, say hr, h2, . . . . h5, are selected and kept secret. These 
morphisms hould be easily parsable, e.g. r\refix codes. For each morphism hi a 
corresponding substitution Oi on A is chosen in a fashion described in Section 1. 
These substitutions are published as well as some collection A’ E d of descendants 
of different letters in 2’. 
The plaintext is some word w’ over A’ and the corresponding cryptotext c is some 
word in the set a~(... ai . ..). The legal recipient can easily compute g(c) and 
then find the unique word w such that g(c)=h5(... hi(w)...). 
According to the theorem presented inSection 2 the cryptanalysist can easily find 
an NFA accepting exactly the words x such that c is in +(... a&)...). He can also 
find the unique word in this set whose letters beiong to d’. This word is w’. 
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